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A B S T R A C T   
Metacognition plays a pivotal role in human development. The ability to realize that we do not know something, 
or meta-ignorance, emerges after approximately five years of age. We sought for the brain systems that underlie 
the developmental emergence of this ability in a preschool sample. 
Twenty-four children aged between five and six years answered questions under three conditions. In the 
critical partial knowledge condition, an experimenter first showed two toys to a child, then announced that she 
would place one of them in a box, out of sight from the child. The experimenter then asked the child whether she 
knew which toy was in the box. 
Children who gave consistently correct answers to this question (n  9) showed greater cortical thickness in a 
cluster within left medial orbitofrontal cortex than children who did not (n  15). Further, seed-based functional 
connectivity analyses of the brain during resting state revealed that this region is functionally connected to the 
medial orbitofrontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus and precuneus, and mid- and inferior temporal gyri. 
This finding suggests that the default mode network, critically through its prefrontal regions, supports 
introspective processing. It leads to the emergence of metacognitive monitoring allowing children to explicitly 
report their own ignorance.   
1. Introduction 
Metacognition, or the ability to monitor one’s own mental states and 
processes, is a crucial cognitive function that enables flexible and 
adaptive behaviour. It has been shown to be a strong predictor of 
cognitive development and, in particular, school achievements 
(Schneider, 2008; Williams et al., 2002). “Metacognition” is a broad 
term, and has been operationalized through a wide variety of behav-
ioural paradigms. These can be explicit, like reporting one’s own 
memory (Chua et al., 2014), perception (Fleming et al., 2010), or focus 
of attention (Whitmarsh et al., 2014, 2017), or implicit, like the control 
of attentional resources (Kentridge and Heywood, 2000), error moni-
toring (Charles et al., 2013) or allocation of study time (Son and Met-
calfe, 2000). Partially different regions within the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) have been found to support different aspects of metacognitive 
monitoring (Dehaene et al., 2017; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). 
From a developmental point of view, two core questions remain 
unanswered. First, what is the specific role of frontal regions and how do 
they relate to other structures? Second, how does the brain’s monitoring 
ability develop? Recent brain imaging experiments on adult volunteers 
(e.g. Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013) 
aimed at answering the first question, whereas behavioural experiments 
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in developing populations aimed at answering the second (e.g. Balcomb 
and Gerken, 2008; Goupil et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2016; Rohwer et al., 
2012; Vo et al., 2014). As a result, these two questions have been largely 
studied independently of one another. We aimed at bridging these two 
research approaches to characterize the neural correlates of the emer-
gence metacognitive monitoring in early childhood. 
To the best of our knowledge, only one recent study investigated the 
neural bases of metacognition in a developmental sample. Fandakova 
et al. (2017) related longitudinal changes in cortical structure with 
changes in meta-memory ability in the transition from late childhood 
into adolescence (7- to 12-year-old children). They found that, as in 
adults, the PFC already plays a crucial role in metacognitive monitoring 
ability, but whether these same neural networks support the emergence 
of metacognitive abilities in early childhood remains unknown. Our 
study attempts to address this question. 
In what follows, we first briefly review existing behavioural results 
on the emergence of metacognition before turning to the task that we 
employed in this study. 
1.1. When do metacognitive abilities develop? 
Different aspects of metacognitive monitoring have been shown to 
develop at different ages. A particularly useful distinction is between 
implicit metacognition —measured through its effect on behaviour, 
potentially present from early on— and explicit metacognition, 
measured through the accuracy of explicit verbal judgements, emerging 
in the preschool years (Proust, 2013). For example, infants persist in 
their answers for a longer time after correct than after incorrect choices 
by 12 months and can regulate their waiting times for a reward in a 
manner that corresponds to their probability of being correct by 18 
months (Goupil and Kouider, 2016). Moreover, Kim et al. (2016) 
showed that 3- and 4-year olds are able to recognize that they do not 
have a piece of information by choosing not to inform a third person 
about it. Crucially however, when Kim et al. explicitly asked the same 
children whether they themselves had this piece of information, chil-
dren often (incorrectly) said that they did. It has been suggested that 
these processes are based on data-driven cues during the learning or 
performance processes itself (Koriat et al., 2008; Proust, 2013). 
Explicit metacognition, on the other hand, refers to our ability to 
reflect on our cognitive processes and state our (lack of) knowledge. For 
example, the famous Socratic paradox “I know that I know nothing” is a 
prototypical explicit metacognitive statement. Classical research has 
shown that young children tend to equate knowing with seeing for both 
others and themselves, and develop the ability to distinguish between 
the two concepts in the preschool years (Pratt and Bryant, 1990; Taylor, 
1988; Wimmer et al., 1988). 
1.2. How do metacognitive abilities develop? 
In order to clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms that subserve the 
emergence of meta-ignorance in early childhood we sought to identify 
the brain regions supporting it. We used a task developed by Rohwer 
et al. (2012) to measure meta-ignorance ability, in which children had to 
evaluate what they knew: An experimenter placed a toy inside a box 
either in plain sight or out-of-sight from a child and asked her whether 
she knew, or did not know, which toy was in the box. The experimenter 
asked this question in three conditions that differed in terms of the 
epistemic state of the child. Two of these conditions posed no serious 
challenge for children as young as 2–3 years old. Children this age could 
answer correctly in situations in which they had either full informational 
access, or none at all. However, in the key partial knowledge condition 
children had seen two possible toys but did not see which of them the 
experimenter had placed in a box. Here, children under 6 years old had 
great difficulty recognizing their own ignorance. This effect cannot be 
easily explained by difficulties with language as, instead, children aged 
5 can correctly judge the mental states of others in situations of partial 
informational access (Pillow et al., 2000; Ruffman, 1996). 
We tested children in pre-school behaviourally in this task, and 
related their performance to cortical thickness and functional connec-
tivity measured on the same day. Given the role of the PFC for meta-
cognitive monitoring in late childhood and adolescents (Fandakova 
et al., 2017), we expected a relationship between cortical thickness in 
PFC and task performance. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
For this study we tested children who were participating in the first 
wave of an ongoing longitudinal study (Brod et al., 2017). Twenty-four 
5- and 6-year olds (mean age (SD): 5.49  0.4, 14 boys) were included. 
Children did a meta-ignorance task and a cognitive battery (see below). 
We tested five additional children but excluded them from analyses due 
to missing data in one or more of the tasks from the cognitive battery: 
One child did not do the working memory task, one did not do the 
cognitive control task, two did not understand or complete the reasoning 
task, and one did not answer to both repetitions of the partial 
knowledge. 
The HippoKID study aimed at studying the effect of schooling on 
cognitive development and followed five-year old pre-schoolers longi-
tudinally over two years. Children were recruited through advertise-
ments in kindergartens, newspapers, and Internet forums for parents. 
Participating children received an honorarium of €10 per hour. All were 
native German speakers, had no history of psychiatric or neurological 
disorders or developmental delays (based on parental report), and were 
born with more than 37 weeks of gestational age. Most children 
belonged to families with high socioeconomic status. 
The testing session lasted approximately 90 min, included cognitive 
testing and approximately 20 min of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). 
To prevent any possible anxiety and excessive movement during MR 
image acquisition, we let children get accustomed to the scanner by 
spending time inside a mock scanner that looked and sounded exactly 
like the real one. Further, an experimenter stood next to the children 
while they lay on the scanner. 
The German Psychological Society (DGPs) approved the study and 
the children’s parents or legal guardians gave written informed consent. 
Procedures conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2. Behavioural tasks 
2.2.1. Meta-ignorance task 
We operationalized explicit metacognition following closely a 
paradigm developed by Rohwer et al. (2012). The task included three 
epistemic conditions that differed in terms of how much knowledge a 
child had about a toy hidden in a box (see Fig. 1A). In all three condi-
tions, the experimenter, sitting across a table from a child, put one of two 
toys inside a cardboard box, and then asked the child a series of ques-
tions about her knowledge. In the complete-knowledge condition, the 
experimenter first showed two toys to the child and asked her to name 
them. If she could name them correctly, the experimenter announced 
that she would place one of the toys in a box with a lid 
(29  18  11.5 cm), and did so in plain sight of the child. She then 
asked the child: “Do you know which toy is in the box, or do you not 
know?” (In German: “Weißt du, welches Spielzeug in dem Karton ist, oder 
weißt du es nicht?”). We call this the knowledge question. Depending on 
the answer, the experimenter asked follow-up questions. If the child said 
that she knew which toy was in the box, the experimenter asked, first: 
“O.K., then tell me which toy is in the box”, then the confirmation 
question: “Do you really know, or are you guessing?” (“Weißt du das 
wirklich, oder ratst nur?”); and finally, “How do you know that the [toy’s 
name] is in the box?” If, instead, the child said that she did not know 
which toy was in the box, the experimenter would ask: “Why don’t you 
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know which toy is inside the box?” The procedure for the other two 
conditions was identical save for what the experimenter showed to the 
child. In the no-knowledge condition, the experimenter did not show the 
two toys to the child, before announcing that she would place one of 
them inside the box, behind the partition screen. Hence, in the 
no-knowledge condition, the child had seen neither of the toys. In the 
crucial partial-knowledge condition, the experimenter showed the two 
toys to the child and asked her to name them. Before placing one of the 
toys in the box, the experimenter placed a black partition screen 
(60  39 cm) that occluded the child’s view of the toys and box. Thus, in 
the partial-knowledge condition, the child knew what two toys the 
experimenter could have put in the box, but did not know which one. 
All children completed the three tasks twice in a fixed order: com-
plete-, no-, partial-, partial-, no-, complete-knowledge. For each child, the 
experimenter randomly drew one of four predetermined sequences of 
toys and followed it. Eight different toys (see Fig. 1B) were available for 
the two repetitions of the two different conditions (complete- and partial- 
knowledge) that required two toys each. One child could not name one of 
the toys, so the experimenter replaced it with an additional toy avail-
able. We coded the responses to each of the questions as correct or 
incorrect. We recorded a video of the testing sessions for all but three 
children, due to technical problems. 
2.2.2. Cognitive control - hearts and flowers task 
We operationalized cognitive control using the “hearts and flowers” 
task (Davidson et al., 2006). The details have been described elsewhere 
(Brod et al., 2017). Briefly, the task included three conditions with 20 
trials each. On each trial of the congruent condition (first block), a heart 
was displayed for 1.5 s either on the right or left side of a computer 
screen and children pressed a key with the corresponding right or left 
hand, on the same side as the displayed heart. The trial ended 2 s after 
image onset. In the incongruent condition (second block) a flower 
appeared on either side of the screen, and children pressed a key on the 
side opposite to the flower. In the mixed condition (third block), hearts 
and flowers were interleaved and children pressed a key on the same 
side of a heart but on the opposite side of a flower. This task requires 
sustained attention, maintenance of task rules in working memory and, 
in the mixed condition, inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. 
Following recommendations for the age range of our sample, we 
calculated each child’s accuracy as the rate of correct responses in the 
mixed condition (Diamond et al., 2007; Diamond and Kirkham, 2005). 
2.2.3. Working memory 
We used the computerized Working Memory Test Battery for Chil-
dren Aged Five to Twelve Years (AGTB 5–12; Hasselhorn, 2012; 
Michalczyk et al., 2013), a German standardized tool assessing working 
memory according to the multicomponent model by Baddeley (1986). 
We administered two subtests and used their average score as a measure 
of working memory ability for each child. Each subtest is a span measure 
with an adaptive testing procedure and consists of ten trials, grouped 
into five testing blocks of two trials. The first block starts with a two-item 
sequence and sequence length is adjusted after each response: If the 
child recalls the presented trial correctly (or incorrectly), the sequence 
length of the subsequent trial increases (or decreases) by one item. In the 
remaining four testing blocks, the sequence length is adjusted more 
conservatively, following two correct (or incorrect) recalls. The mini-
mum span length is two items. If recall is incorrect for only one of the 
two trials, the span length remains the same. The span score is based on 
the mean performance in the last four testing blocks. For each correct 
response, the child receives a score that corresponds to the span length 
(i.e., the number of items within the presented sequence). For instance, 
if the child correctly recalls a five-item sequence, she receives five 
points. A false response is assigned the span length minus one (e.g., 
incorrect repetition of a five-item sequence results in four points). 
Corsi span: Using a sequential presentation format, this task captures 
the inner scribe of the sketchpad (e.g. Logie, 1995). A smiley face is 
displayed sequentially in one of nine white squares (950 ms display 
time, 50 ms inter-stimulus interval), placed pseudo-randomly on a grey 
background. At the end of each trial, children touch the squares where 
the smiley was shown, in the same sequential order. 
Colour span backwards: This task captures two aspects of the central 
executive: coordinative complexity of controlling encoding and recall, 
and selective focus on relevant information. A sequence of filled col-
oured circles is presented in the centre of the screen for 2 s each. At 
recall, children reproduce the sequence in reversed order by touching 
filled coloured circles arranged in a larger circle. 
2.2.4. Reasoning ability 
We operationalized reasoning ability using the Culture Fair IQ Test 
(Cattell, 1950). Briefly, the test consists of ten questions where children 
see a series of images that follow a logical pattern. Because the pattern is 
never explicitly given, children have to infer it and choose the correct 
answer (out of five available) that is consistent with the inferred pattern. 
We considered the number of correct responses to the task. 
2.3. MRI data acquisition 
Structural data were acquired using a T1-weighted 3-D 
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo sequence (repetition 
time 2500 ms, echo time 2500 ms, sagittal slice orientation, spatial 
Fig. 1. Meta-ignorance task. (A.) Task design. 
In the complete-knowledge condition, children 
saw an experimenter put one of two toys in a 
box. In the partial-knowledge condition, chil-
dren saw two toys and the experimenter put one 
of them inside a box, behind an occlusion 
screen (represented in the figure by the vertical 
line) and out of sight from the child. In the no- 
knowledge condition, children saw neither the 
toys nor the experimenter as she put one of 
them inside a box. The experimenter asked 
children the same epistemic questions in all 
conditions. (B.) Materials. Toys used in the task.   
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resolution  1  1  1 mm). T2*-weighted echo-planar images were ac-
quired using a 3-T Siemens TIM Trio MRI scanner with a 12-channel 
head coil (transverse slice orientation, interleaved ascending scanning 
direction), field of view  216 mm, repetition time 2000 ms, echo 
time 30 ms, 36 slices, slice thickness  3 mm, matrix  72  72, voxel 
size  3  3  3 mm, distance factor  10%, 152 volumes). 
2.4. MRI data analysis 
2.4.1. Preprocessing MRI data with the computational anatomy toolbox 
(CAT12) 
We estimated cortical thickness using surface-based morphometry as 
implemented in CAT12 (r1278) (Jena University Hospital, Departments 
of Psychiatry and Neurology, http://www.neuro.uni-jena.de/cat/) 
running on SPM12 (Wellcome Department for Imaging Neuroscience, 
London, United Kingdom; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and Mat-
lab R2016b (The MathWorks, MA, USA). We used an age-adequate tis-
sue probability map (TPM), generated though the average approach of 
the Template-o-matic toolbox (Wilke et al., 2008) instead of the default 
TPM for the segmentation, and default parameters otherwise. The data 
were then affine-registered to the MNI space and a non-linear defor-
mation was applied. The deformation parameters were calculated with 
classical registration to the existing DARTEL template in MNI space 
generated from 555 participants from the IXI Dataset (Ashburner, 2007) 
(http://brain-development.org/ixi-dataset/). We did not correct the 
data manually, and a check of sample homogeneity revealed no issues. 
Surface and thickness were then estimated using projection-based 
thickness estimation methods (Dahnke et al., 2013). Finally, we 
applied a smoothing kernel of 15 FWHM and submitted the resulting 
images to statistical analyses. 
2.5. Functional connectivity analyses 
2.5.1. Preprocessing 
We excluded the first five MR images of the series from the functional 
analyses to ensure steady-state longitudinal magnetization. We used 
SPM12 to preprocess the remaining images. We first performed slice 
timing correction and realignment, followed by coregistration between 
functional images and the individual anatomical T1 images. We then 
segmented the anatomical images into white matter, gray matter, and 
cerebrospinal fluid using the same age-adequate TPM as for the struc-
tural analyses. We normalized the resulting functional images to the 
MNI template and applied spatial smoothing with a 6-mm FWHM to 
improve signal-to-noise ratio. To reduce physiological high-frequency 
respiratory and cardiac noise and low-frequency drift, we used the 
REST toolbox (Song et al., 2011) to bandpass-filter (0.01–1 Hz) and 
detrend the data. We regressed out the signal from white matter and 
cerebrospinal fluid as well as the motion parameters. Additionally, we 
calculated the framewise displacement (FD) according to Power et al. 
(Power et al., 2012). We excluded from the analyses one child who had 
an FD above the recommended threshold of 0.6. 
2.5.2. Functional connectivity and seed-based functional connectivity 
To examine connectivity between brain regions using seed-based 
functional connectivity (FC) as implemented in the REST toolbox, we 
calculated voxel-wise temporal (Pearson) correlations between a seed 
based on the structural results (see below) and the whole brain. We then 
applied Fischer transformations to the individual FC maps, to obtain z- 
scores to improve normality; and then submitted the z-score maps to a 
second-level analysis in SPM12, using movement (FD), age, sex, working 
memory, cognitive control and reasoning ability as covariates. We 
identified regions showing consistent levels of FC using a one-sample t- 
test and performed group comparison using a two-sample t-test. Both 
analyses were FWE corrected with an additional threshold of p < 0.05 at 
the voxel level, and cluster size >100 voxels. 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioural results 
Fig. 2A shows all responses to the knowledge and confirmation 
questions for each child and each condition. As Rohwer et al. (2012) 
reported, the complete-knowledge condition posed no challenge for chil-
dren. Here, all 24 children answered (correctly) in both repetitions of 
the task that they knew which toy was in the box, but one child answered 
incorrectly in the confirmation question (i.e., they responded that they 
guessed the contents of the box, although they had seen the experi-
menter put the toy in the box). Although the no-knowledge condition was 
slightly more difficult, most (18 out of 24) children replied correctly to 
both instances. However, six children incorrectly responded in at least 
one instance that they knew which of two toys was inside the box, 
although they had not seen either of the toys. Finally, in the crucial 
partial-knowledge condition, 15 children responded (incorrectly) in at 
least one instance that they knew which of the two toys was in the box 
(and 9 children responded correctly to both instances). The parti-
al-knowledge condition appeared to be the most difficult for children and 
—in all but one case— those children who responded incorrectly to at 
least one instance of the no-knowledge condition also responded incor-
rectly to the partial-knowledge condition. 
We studied the effect of age on performance in the partial knowledge 
task (Fig. 2B) using a logistic regression. We found no significant effect 
of age (χ2(1)  0.529, p  0.467. In fact, the evidence favoured the null 
hypothesis of no effect of age, as estimated by a Bayes Factor with a 
standard Cauchy prior (BF10  0.267). 
3.2. Structural correlates of explicit metacognition 
To identify brain structures that support meta-ignorance, we 
compared cortical thickness in the whole brain between two groups of 
children: those who responded correctly to both trials of the partial- 
knowledge condition and those who did not (similar to Wimmer and 
Perner, 1983). In a multiple regression, we looked for differences be-
tween the groups while accounting for age (in months), sex, working 
memory, cognitive control, and reasoning scores as covariates of no 
interest. After correction for non-stationary smoothness and expected 
cluster size, the group comparison revealed a positive effect in a single 
cluster spanning medial (mOFC, 79%) and superior orbitofrontal cortex 
(21%) (p  0.00021, cluster extent k  61, see Fig. 3A). Further, two 
small but bilateral clusters showed a negative effect on superior parietal 
cortex (left: p  0.00011, k  30, 87% superior parietal, 13% inferior 
parietal; right: p  0.00028, k  15, 100% superior parietal, see 
Fig. 3B). 
The appropriate way to control for potential effects of the covariates 
of no interest is, as we did above, to include them in the multiple 
regression analysis. But this approach is obscure, in that it is not clear 
what effect, if any, these additional regressors have on the results. To try 
to reveal these potential effects, we additionally explored potential re-
lationships between performance in the metacognitive task and the 
other behavioural measures that we considered (see Fig. 4). In a series of 
tests, we found no differences between groups in working memory 
ability (t(17.2)  1.14, p  0.27, BF10  0.60), cognitive control (t 
(15.62)  -0.51, p  0.62, BF10  0.42) or reasoning ability (t 
(21.06)  0.29, p  0.77, BF10  0.39). We also found no differences 
between the two groups in terms of age in days (t(16.14)  -0.35, p 
0.72, BF10  0.4) or sex (X
2(1)  0.04, p  0.83, BF10  0.57). The two 
groups also did not differ in their tendency to move inside the scanner 
(measured as mean framewise displacement during resting state; t 
(16.14)  -0.36, p  0.73, BF10  0.4). Hence, our effects are specific to 
metacognitive ability and cannot easily be explained by any of the other 
covariates included in the model. 
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Fig. 2. Behavioural results. (A.) All conditions: 
Responses to each of the six questions (two per 
condition) for each child, for both the knowl-
edge question and the first follow up (confir-
mation) question. Each child’s responses are 
arranged vertically, children are sorted by age 
(increasing towards the right). The colours code 
for response accuracy for each of the knowledge 
and confirmation questions, as it is indicated in 
the legend. (B.) Partial-knowledge condition: 
Number of correct responses to the partial 
knowledge condition as a function of age.   
Fig. 3. Group differences in cortical thickness (correct vs. incorrect responses in the partial-knowledge condition). Accounting for sex, age, working memory, 
cognitive control, and reasoning, the group that responded correctly showed greater cortical thickness in a region within the left mid- and superior orbitofrontal 
cortex (A.), and thinner cortex in bilateral superior parietal cortex (B.), as compared to the group with at least one incorrect response. 
Fig. 4. Relationships between all variables considered in the multiple regression model. We isolated the differences related to performance in the partial- knowledge 
condition whilst controlling for age, sex, working memory ability, cognitive control, and reasoning ability. The figure shows the relationships between all these 
variables. There was no association between our variable of interest and covariates of no interest, suggesting that the effect is specific to metacognitive performance. 
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3.3. Seed-based functional connectivity results 
Structural analyses revealed that a region in the left mOFC region is 
involved in the accurate processing of meta-ignorance. To better un-
derstand the role of this region, we measured seed-based connectivity 
during resting state, which infers the functional network between a re-
gion of interested given by a specific seed and all voxels in the brain. We 
calculated whole brain functional connectivity z-maps (based on Pear-
son’s correlations) for each child using a 10 mm-radius seed centred on 
(x    8, y  53, z    1) and regressing out FD as a measure of move-
ment (Power et al., 2012). We ran two exploratory analyses on the 
functional connectivity data. In the first analysis we compared the two 
groups to determine whether differences in functional connectivity 
during resting state could explain the behavioural results. In the second 
analysis we ran a one-sample t-test (across both groups) to identify the 
network that the frontal region we identified in structural analyses is 
part of. As in the analysis of brain structure, we used age (in months), 
sex, working memory, cognitive control, and reasoning ability scores as 
covariates of no interest in the statistical models. 
The comparison between groups yielded no significant results (i.e., 
no cluster of voxels survived our corrections for multiple comparisons 
consisting of FWE correction, p < 0.05 at the voxel level, and cluster size 
>100 voxels). Instead, our group analysis showed statistically signifi-
cant (i.e., consistent) functional connectivity between the prefrontal 
seed and left medial orbitofrontal gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus 
and right precuneus, and mid- and inferior temporal gyri (see Table 1 
and Fig. 5). 
4. Discussion 
We investigated the neural mechanisms relating to the emergence of 
explicit metacognition in preschool children by means of MRI. We 
concentrated on a “meta-ignorance” task, where children are required to 
recognize —and explicitly report— that they lack certain information. 
Previous results had shown that children develop this ability at around 
5  6 years of age (Kloo et al., 2017; Rohwer et al., 2012). Our structural 
analyses revealed that a cortical region within the medial prefrontal 
cortex was thicker in those children that correctly identified that they 
did not know something. Our functional resting state analyses, in turn, 
revealed that this region is connected to the left medial orbitofrontal 
gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus and right precuneus, and mid- and 
inferior temporal gyri, which are regions belonging to the default-mode 
network (Deco et al., 2011). These results highlight the neural networks 
that give rise to the emergence of explicit metacognition in early 
childhood. In the following sections, we bring our results in the context 
of the existing literature in both children and adults. 
4.1. Behavioural results 
In their original study, Rohwer et al. (2012) used a cross-sectional 
design to test 2–7 year-old children’s performance in the 
meta-ignorance task. In their sample, the strongest differences in per-
formance in the partial-knowledge condition occurred between 5 and 
6 years-old children. In line with these results, we found that under half 
(9 out of 24) of the children aged 5–6 responded correctly to both rep-
etitions in the partial-knowledge condition, suggesting that this is a crit-
ical transition age. However, we did not find a positive relationship 
between performance and age, but we note that we tested children 
within a narrower age range than Rohwer et al. Overall, this demon-
strates that we successfully implemented the task and allows us to 
interpret the results of our structural and connectivity analyses. 
4.2. Structural results 
We considered that a child is proficient in the meta-ignorance task if 
she could answer correctly to both instances of the partial-knowledge 
condition (similar to Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Nine out of 24 children 
could answer correctly to the two instances of this condition. We 
exploited this fact to build two groups: those that answered correctly to 
the meta-ignorance task and those who did not. The group of children 
who answered correctly showed significantly greater estimates of 
cortical thickness within left orbitofrontal cortex, even when accounting 
for other higher-order cognitive abilities like working memory, 
reasoning and cognitive control, as well as sex and age. Further, children 
who responded correctly to the task showed two small, bilateral clusters 
in the superior parietal cortex with significantly smaller cortical thick-
ness estimates. Both frontal and parietal regions have been described 
previously as relevant for performance monitoring and the formation of 
confidence (for a review, see Chua et al., 2014). Our study adds to 
previous research by demonstrating that these regions also subserve the 
emergence of metacognition. Here we discuss the two regions 
separately. 
The cluster in mOFC is consistent with previous studies showing that 
structural parameters within the prefrontal cortex are associated with 
metacognitive ability in adults (Bertrand et al., 2018; Cul et al., 2009; 
Filevich et al., 2015; Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; Schnyer 
et al., 2004). Moreover, the direction of the effect (namely thicker cortex 
associated with better cognitive performance) is in line with neuro-
developmental trajectory studies showing that thickness increases in 
children with the age of our sample and peaks only later —at around 8 
years of age— over the whole cortex (Raznahan et al., 2011) and in 
frontal regions specifically (Shaw et al., 2008). In particular, a recent 
study (Fandakova et al., 2017) on meta-memory found that cortical 
thickening in the ventromedial PFC predicted metacognitive improve-
ments in 7–12 years-old children. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report a negative 
relationship between metacognitive ability and structural cortical 
characteristics in the superior parietal cortex. The contribution of neural 
activity in primate parietal regions to decision confidence is well 
established (e.g., Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). In humans, BOLD (blood--
oxygen-level dependent) signal levels in parietal cortex vary with re-
ported confidence, In particular, Chua et al. (2014) recently noted that 
whereas inferior parietal cortex is often associated with high vs. low 
confidence, superior parietal cortex shows the inverse effect, i.e. higher 
BOLD signal levels in low confidence trials (Hayes et al., 2011; Kim and 
Cabeza, 2007, 2009; Moritz et al., 2006). Based on these results, Chua 
et al. hypothesised distinct roles of superior and inferior parietal cortex 
in confidence formation. 
The negative relationship that we found between superior parietal 
cortex and meta-ignorance ability is in line with the hypothesis put 
forward by Chua et al. (2014). However, we should note that a link 
between functional results and structural characteristics is equivocal 
and should be re-examined in future studies, possibly by including both 
Table 1 
Seed-based whole brain voxel functional connectivity results for the whole 
sample.   
Peak MNI 
Coordinates t- 
score 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
x y z 
Left medial orbitofrontal 
cortex 
  2 52   6 30 
4676 
Left anterior cingulate gyrus   12 48 0 30 
Left medial frontal gyrus   10 58 2 28 
Left posterior cingulate 
gyrus 
  4   42 24 21 
919   10   46 30 17 
Right precuneus 4   48 14 16 
Left middle temporal gyrus 
  60   20   6 17 
189   56   28   8 13 
Left inferior temporal gyrus   52   22   20 13  
E. Filevich et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 41 (2020) 100738
7
functional and structural measures in order to test their links to 
meta-ignorance ability explicitly. 
4.3. How does metacognition develop? 
Two main hypotheses have been put forward to explain the emer-
gence of explicit metacognitive ability. The “Simulation theory” proposes 
that children learn to recognize their own mental states by building on 
the neural systems that monitor the mental states of others (i.e., theory of 
mind (ToM) e.g Goldman, 2006; Harris, 1992; Lecce et al., 2015; Lockl 
and Schneider, 2007). A different notion, stemming from the so called 
theory-theory suggests instead that children rely on lay theories and rules 
that are applied to self and other in order to understand mental states (e. 
g. Gopnik and Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991) and that, in the way of 
Bayesian observers, children inform and narrow their priors as they 
learn to understand the world (Gopnik and Wellman, 2012). Rohwer 
et al. (2012) interpreted their results of the partial-knowledge condition 
in line with the latter notion: they argued that children follow cues to 
answer metacognitive questions concerning their own knowledge: it will 
suffice that they can produce a plausible answer to a question (regard-
less of its accuracy) for children to judge that they know the answer to 
the question, regardless of whether this answer is correct. 
Our experiment was not designed to arbitrate between these two 
theories, and our data alone can therefore not solve the dispute. Instead, 
here we take a neurocognitive approach: we rely on existent activation- 
likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses to compare our results to 
previous literature on ToM. Meta-analyses from studies in healthy young 
adults reveal ToM consistent activations across different tasks in the 
medial PFC, but these are mostly located ventrally to the cluster we 
identified (Schurz et al., 2014 -c.f. Fig. 5-;van Veluw and Chance, 2014. 
Further, a meta-analysis identified several regions related to 
domain-general metacognition distinct from those supporting ToM 
(Vaccaro and Fleming, 2018). In order to better understand the role of 
the prefrontal region that we identified through structural analyses, we 
ran exploratory analyses to examine its functional connectivity pattern, 
which we describe below. 
4.4. Functional connectivity results 
We used the cluster identified through structural analyses to calcu-
late seed-based FC to explore consistent intrinsic functional connectivity 
patterns from the seed to the rest of the brain. In this set of exploratory 
analyses, we did not find any significant differences in functional con-
nectivity between the two groups of children. In the second analysis we 
found that the seed in left medial orbitofrontal cortex was functionally 
connected to left medial orbitofrontal gyrus, left posterior cingulate 
gyrus and precuneus, and mid- and inferior temporal gyri. This con-
nectivity pattern includes three core regions of the default model 
network (DMN), namely the medial PFC (mPFC), posterior cingulate 
cortex/precuneus and lateral temporal cortices and is in line with the 
literature in including the mOFC in the DMN (Raichle, 2015). We note 
that, with our comparatively small sample size, we cannot make a strong 
claim about the network function of the mOFC. Nor do we aim to make 
general inferences about the composition of the DMN in 5  6 year old 
children. Instead, we take this result to show that our sample shows 
roughly the same connectivity as has been described in the literature, 
validating our interpretation, described below. 
BOLD activity within DMN regions is typically associated with self- 
referential thought and introspection (Davey et al., 2016; Northoff 
et al., 2006; Qin and Northoff, 2011). And a handful of studies that 
related functional connectivity during resting state to inter-individual 
differences in metacognitive ability found that the PFC is both a key 
component of metacognitive monitoring and connected to regions 
within the DMN (Barttfeld et al., 2013; Soto et al., 2017; Francis et al., 
2017). Thus, we speculate that the mOFC may enable accurate meta-
cognitive monitoring thought its role in the 
self-referential/self-monitoring network. 
In light of this interpretation, one important question is whether the 
DMN in our developmental sample is analogous to that of adults. 
Overall, the existing literature indicates that an adult-like DMN 
Fig. 5. Seed-based functional connectivity. A 10mm-radius seed based on the results from the structural analyses and the whole brain revealed consistent fronto- 
temporal fronto-cingulate connections for the whole group. 
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architecture is already present and relatively stable at one year of age. In 
particular, the posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortices, as well as 
the mPFC appear to be crucial network hubs, already integrated in the 
newborn brain (Gao et al., 2009). While brain regions active during rest 
in very young infants overlap only partially with the adult DMN 
(Fransson et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2009), functional connections (in 
particular long-distance) develop rapidly during the first year of age 
(Gao et al., 2009), and continue to develop at a slower pace for several 
years after that (Fair et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2011; Khan et al., 2018). In 
short, because the DMN network continues to mature and develop into 
adolescence, we caution against committing to an unqualified inter-
pretation of these results. But, to the extent that the main features of the 
network are already in place at the age of the children in our sample, we 
are justified in interpreting the functional connectivity results in light of 
self-reflection and DMN. We stress that this interpretation is speculative, 
as we did not find a direct connection between task performance and 
functional connectivity. But our results do suggest that the mOFC is 
already connected with DMN-related regions at a young age. Future 
studies may directly test this idea. 
4.5. Limitations 
Several limitations of these results should be mentioned. First, as 
virtually any empirical study of metacognitive processing, the results 
cannot a priori be generalized to other metacognitive functions. Just as 
studies in adults have revealed different neural bases for different 
metacognitive tasks and suggested some degree of domain-specificity 
(Baird et al., 2014; Fleming et al., 2014), studies in developmental 
populations have revealed that different aspects of metacognitive 
monitoring develop at different developmental stages (Goupil and 
Kouider, 2016; Goupil et al., 2016; S. Kim et al., 2016). An interesting 
question for future studies could be whether inter-individual differences 
between these different aspects are stable over development. 
We now consider three potential objections to the experimental 
paradigm. First, could these results be explained by the parsimonious 
interpretation that children had a general bias against admitting their 
own ignorance, or that they did not understand the terms “knowing” and 
“guessing”? The results of the no-knowledge condition argue against this 
explanation: If any of these two scenarios were true, those children that 
answered incorrectly in the partial-knowledge condition should have also 
answered incorrectly in the no-knowledge condition (i.e. answering that 
they knew which toy was in the box in both cases). This was only the 
case for five out of the 15 children in our sample, so this effect alone 
cannot explain our results. Further, previous literature suggests that 
children this age understand the difference between (and spontaneously 
use) the terms “knowing” and “guessing” without ambiguity (e.g., 
Moore et al., 1989; Shatz et al., 1983). See Rohwer et al. (2012) for a 
more detailed argument. 
Second, our analysis of children’s behaviour in the meta-ignorance 
task followed Wimmer and Perner (1983) by treating metacognitive 
ability as binary: a child can either solve the problem, providing 
consistently correct answers, or she cannot yet. This allowed us to 
maximize the contrasts in our analysis. Yet, metacognitive ability is not 
all-or-none and its development does not finish during childhood. Other 
paradigms that quantify metacognitive ability on a continuous scale 
offer finer grained information (Geurten et al., 2015; Hembacher and 
Ghetti, 2014; Paulus et al., 2014; Weil et al., 2013; see also Ghetti et al., 
2013for a review). Future studies may consider these paradigms in early 
developmental samples like ours to draw connections between the 
developmental trajectory or metacognitive ability and its neural bases. 
A final limitation of these results is our relatively small sample size. 
We nevertheless note that our cortical thickness results are in line with 
previous studies and consistent internally, with our functional connec-
tivity analyses. All in all, our results go beyond previous literature, and 
may help constrain and inform future developmental studies. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Children who answered correctly to a metacognitive task had greater 
cortical thickness in a cluster within medial prefrontal cortex, compared 
to children who answered incorrectly to the task. This cluster did not 
overlap with regions previously identified in adults as supporting theory 
of mind, a cognitive function thought to be related to —and, under some 
accounts, be a precursor of— metacognition. Instead, together with our 
functional connectivity analyses, the complete pattern of results recalls 
the default-mode network, often associated with self-referential thought 
and introspection. Our results suggest that children’s metacognitive 
ability to recognize that they do not know something depends on a 
mature default-mode network that supports introspective processing. 
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